Abstract-Motivated by the needs of NASA's Voyager 2 mission, in this paper we describe an algorithm which detects and corrects losses of node synchronization in convolutionally encoded data. This algorithm, which would be implemented as a hardware device external to a Viterbi decoder, makes statistical decisions shout node synch based on the hard-quantized undecoded data stream. ,We will show that in a worst-case Voyager environment, our method will detect and correct a true loss of synch (thought to be a very rare event) within several hundred bits; many of the resulting outages will be corrected by the outer Reed-Solomon code. At the same time, the mean time between false alarms is on the order of several years, independent of the signal-to-noise ratio.
I. INTRODUCTION
ECENT studies [ 11, [ 21 have shown that at the very low signal-to-noise ratios NASA's Voyager-2 mission will encounter at Uranus in 1986, the performance of the ReedSolomon/Viterbi concatenated coding system could be seriously degraded by erratic behavior in the node synchronization subsystem of NASA's hardware decoder. In this paper we will show that this problem can be avoided by disabling the Viterbi decoder's internal synchronization hardware a n d , replacing it with a simple outboard hardware node synchronizer whose details we describe in this paper.
For definiteness, this paper will deal only with the system parameters relevant to Voyager, but our technique is applicable (with minor modifications) to any convolutionally encoded telecommunications system.
On Voyager, the high-rate downlink telemetry is protected by a K = 7 , rate 1/2 convolutional code concatenated with a depth-4 interleaved (255, 223) Reed-Solomon code. In principle this combination provides. excellent error protection (bit error probability 1.OE-6) for Voyager's highly sensitive imaging data, at bit signal-to-noise ratios as low as 2.9 dB. Since the rate of the outer code is 223/255 = -0.6 dB, when the overall SNR is 2.9 dB, the inner convolutional code is operating at about 2.3 dB.
However, in practice, the performance of the concatenated system is significantly worse than theoretical predictions. One problem is carrier-loop jitter, which degrades performance by 0.5 dB or more [ 11. This means that if the system bit SNR remains at the nominal 2.9 dB value, the inner convolutional code must operate at less than 2.0 dB. This is a value much lower than that for which the Deep Space Network's hardware Viterbi decoders were designed. In this demanding .environment, the Viterbi decoder's internal node synchronization hardware, whose function is to detect and correct true external losses of node synch, is prone to produce false alarms, i.e., spurious losses of node synch, and send useless data to the Reed-Solomon decoder until node synch is reestablished. In [2] it was shown that this hardware problem can degrade Voyager's performance by a further 1 .O dB or more.
In this article we shall show that this data loss due to spurious node synch loss in the Viterbi decoder is completely avoidable. Our proposed solution involves disabling the Viterbi decoder's internal synchronization hardware and implementing an external node synch algorithm. Our .algorithm is easy t o implement and depends on likelihood calculations based on observations of the hard-quantized encoded data stream. In a worst-case Voyager environment, our method will detect and correct a true loss of node synch within several hundred bits; many of these outages will, be corrected by the Reed-Solomon code. On the other hand, the mean time between false alarms for our technique (which is independent of the SNR) is on the order of several years. Thus, for practical purposes our technique introduces no false alarms, and the system SNR loss due to node synch problems will be e~i n a t e d , with no loss of protection against true node synch losses. As an outboard hardware device, our algorithm could be implemented on a single Deep Space Network standard single-board computer such as the iSBC 86/12, at least at data rates up to 20 kbits/s.
The paper is divided into three sections (this is Section I). In Section 11, we present a functional description of our algorithm, together with a summary of the relevant mathematics. In Section 111, we present some numerical performance results for our technique. They will quantify the assertions made above (mean time between false alarms, probability of uncorrectable errors due to true loss of synch, etc.). We also include in the Appendixes some background information.
THE UP-DOWN COUNTER
We adopt the following model, which has been found to be very accurate for coherent deep-space communication [ 
.
The information to be transmitted via the convolutional code We also define the * versions of the encoded stream: is twice the symbol SNR. The Viterbi decoder attempt: to recover the message bits from the noisy code sequence { D k } . It does this by making a very efficient maximum likelihood estimate of each of the message bits { M 2 / } . However, in order to operate, the Viterbi decoder must have node synch, i.e., it must know which of the received symbols have even subscripts and which have odd subscripts. Of course, there are only two possibilities, but if the wrong hypothesis is made, the output of the Viterbi decoder will bear no useful relationship to the message stream { M 2 i ) .
Our algorithm will provide node synch information for the Viterbi decoder. It is based on the hard-quantized received sequence { R k } , where Associated with the hard-quantized received sequence
The foregoing describes the distribution of the received sequence and of the parity-check sequence in case node synchronization is maintained. This will be called the in-synch hypothesis. The out-of-synch hypothesis describes the situation when node synchronization is in error. In this case the R i s and Xi's behave as though the subscripts were shifted by one. Thus, under the out-of-synch hypothesis it is the odd parity checks that are correct with probability n and the even ones that are purely random.
We assume that node synchronization has been acquired and maintained and that the in-synch hypothesis is initially true. We wish to monitor the received sequence so as to detect loss of synch, i.e., a sudden change making the received sequence obey t h e , out-of-synch hypothesis, A method for doing this simply can be based on a general statistical technique [ 7 1 for detecting a change in distribution.'To apply this technique it is necessary to simplify the model by assuming that the parity checks X i , are independent. They are not independent for even i, but the dependence between widely separated Xi's is slight, so calculations based on this assumption should be illustrative. The method for detecting loss of synch is based on a counter with increments where p(X,) and q ( X , ) are the likelihoods of X,, under the in-synch and out-of-synch hypotheses, respectively. As shown above 1/2 if n is odd n if n is even and X, = 0 1 -n if n is even and X , = I whereas q(X,) reverses the odd and even cases. Thus, The counter is defined by
A threshold y > 0 is chosen, and the process stops the first time T , 2 y. Since at this point there is a substantial likelihood ratio in favor of the out-of-synch hypotheses, the inference is made that loss of node synchronization has occurred. This loss of node synch can be remedied by either adding or deleting a channel symbol; the node synchronizer will alternate adding and deleting symbols in order to avoid ruining frame boundaries in case of false loss of synch.
The performance of such a counter for a particular y is characterized by two average run lengths (ARL's).
1) The short A R L . This is the average number of pairs of symbols needed to reach the threshold if the out-of-synch hypothesis is true from the beginning.
2) The long A R L . This is the average number of pairs of symbols needed to reach the threshold if the in-synch hypothesis remains true.
The short ARL gives an upper bound on the average time between loss of syhch and its detection, since whenever loss of synch occurs, the counter has a nonnegative value. The long ARL (or its reciprocal) describes the frequency of false detection of loss of node synchronization.
An exact determination of the ARL's will be made in Section 111, for a, very slight modification of the scheme described. Since each pair of symbols generates one even X, and one odd X,, Table I shows the dependence of the information numbers on, p e , the symbol error probability. It should be noted that the information numbers decrease substantially as the symbol error probability becomes larger. Thus, the ARL's become less favorable as p e increases.
If one makes the very slight change of inspecting the counter only at even n, i.e., once for each pair of symbols, then a simpler description of the counter is possible. This is because two consecutive X,'s = 0 (successful parity checks) yield a net change of zero, as do consecutive X,'s = 1. If, however, one of the pair of X,'s is 0 and the other 1, then the total increment of the counter is easily seen t o be log ( n / l -n), with + if and only if the odd X, = 0 (Le., both a successful check for the out-of-synch hypothesis and a failure for the in-synch hypothesis). Thus, the counter moves up and down by a fixed step size and standard random walk formulas [3, 
Counter with Memory
A simple parity check counter does a fairly good job of node synchronization in case of high SNR [ 51 . But in the case of high symbol error probability, the probability of parity check error is quite high. For example, symbol error probability 0.1 corresponds to 7r = 0.45. Thus; in-synch data with p e = 0.1 will fail an even parity check with Probability 0.45, while out-of-synch data will fail the even parity checks with probabiiity 0.5. A counter to distinguish between distributions which are so close will either require a long time to react to incorrect synch or have a large probability of incorrect ,change.
Performance numbers for such a counter are indicated in Table   I1 above;
. . ' If the pafity checks were independent, there would be no way to improve thisperformance [7] But the parity checks are not independent. This ,is because, under the in-synch hypothesis, one channel symbol error changes the value of five even parity checks. Under the in-synch hypothesis, for example, an isolated error in the ( n -12)th channel symbol will cause parity check failures at time n , n -2 , n -6 , h -8, and n -12. Thus, a long sequence of successful parity checks would lead us to believe that another success is on the way, while the sequence X n T l~ = 1, X n -l~ = 0, X n -g = 1, X i -6 = 1, = Oi. X n P 2 = 1 would lead one to believe that X, is very likely to be 1. The reason a log-likelihood counter works so well in the independent case is that by adding logarithms we multiply their arguments. After receiving parity checks Xi = xl, X 2 = x 2 , -e, Xi, = x,, where each x i is 0 or 1, the counter
If the parity checks were independent, this would be exactly log (
the log of the ratio of the likelihood of the string (Xl = x l , X , = x 2 , e * . , X , = X , ) under the two hypotheses, which is statistically optimal for detecting loss of synchronization.
In the case of noisy convolutionally encoded data, the probability of a string of parity checks is not just the product of the probabilities of the individual parity checks. Updating the p probability of a string requires the conditional probability p ( X , = x , I X,-= x , -,, X,-2 = X , -2 , ..., X 1 = x , ) . Therefore, a counter with increment In general, the counter using k parity checks has increment
The system which we have investigated in detail is therefore a system which takes hard-quantized received channel symbols R l , R 2 , ..., creates parity checks X l 4 , X, 5, ... with X i = R i R i -, +R i-, 3 , and keeps a counter whose increment at time n is Ri-1 f R i -3 + Ri-4 f Ri-5 + Ri--6 f Ri-7 + Ri-10 + would, after step r, contain -exactly the log of the quantity we desire. Of course, a real counter will not take into account a past of indefinite length. But a (possibly large) integer m can be chosen, and a counter constructed whose increment at time n is As might be expected, for large m , the information number approaches the information number for the hypothetical counter based on the indefinite past of the parity check sequence. This is verified in Appendix A. Moreover, the information numbers obtained using the parity check sequence are identical with information numbers obtainable from the hard quantized received sequence. This means that there is no loss of information or efficiency in using the parity check sequence instead of the hard quantized received sequence to detect loss of node synchronization-this is also shown in Appendix A. Also, Appendix A shows that the counter increments depend only on parity checks of the same (odd or even) type, i.e., (8) is unchanged if the given = = ..*) is replaced by ( X n p 2 = x n P 2 , X n -4 = x , -4 , ...). We will describe the counter in terms of the number of parity checks used to determine the counter increment, and we will call this k. For example, the "simple" (memoryless) parity check counter corresponds to k = 1, while the counter f o r k = 8 has counter increments 4 ( X , = x, I X n -2 = x n -2 , " ' , X n -1 4 -x n -1 4 )
, P(x, = X , I X n -2 = X n -2 j . ' * * , X n -1 4 -x n -1 4 ) --In order to design this counter, we need to know P ( X , = same event for even and odd n. To calculate these values, remember that for in-synch data, the even parity checks depend only on the sequence of channel symbol errors. so given a probability p e of symbol error, we can calculate the probability that E , = e,, E,-1 =en-1 , " ' 9 E n -2 k -1 1 = e n -2 k -1 1 for each sequence e , , e n -1 , , e n -2 k -1 1 , and use these probabilities to CalcUlatep(X, = X , , " ' , X n -2 k + 2 = X n -2 k t 2 ) and p(X,-2 = X n -2 , "', X n -2 k + 2 = X n -2 k + 2 ) and find even n. X,'s are independent with p ( X , = 0) = 1/2. Thus -x , 1Xn-2 -x , -2 , "', X n -2 k + 2 = X , -2 k + 2 ) and 4 Of the ... p ( X n = x n l X n -2 = x n -2 , "'3 X n -Z k + Z -x r 1 -2 k + 2 ) for -For odd n , just as in the case of the simple counter, the P(Xn = x n~/ x n -2 = x n -2 , . . ' , X n -2 k + 2 = X n -2 k + Z ) = 1/2 for odd n.
To calculate the probabilities 4 associated with the out-ofsynch hypothesis, just exchange even with odd in the above argument. From these values, we can calculate the counter increments, We did this assuming a channel symbol error rate of 0.1, which corresponds to a Viterbi decoded bit error rate of 5 X loe3, the standard for imaging data. Voyager's data rate has been adjusted so that this is the largest channel symbol error rate which will be encountered.
Information Numbers and Run Lengths
Just as in the case of the up-down counter, the average run lengths are essentially determined by the threshold y and the information number The information I from a pair of parity checks is the sum of the information number I , from the odd parity checks (the average increment of the counter at odd n ) and I2 from the even parity checks. Table I11 shows the contributions of these two parity check subsequences, revealing that the odd checks contribute roughly two thirds of the total information.
In designing the detection algorithm, we must choose a symbol error probability p e , at which the counter is designed to operate most efficiently.
In practice, as the true symbol error probability variesfwith the signal-to-noise ratio, it will generally be smaller than p e , so that fewer parity check failures occur.
In this case, the counter will perform better whether the data are in synch or not, i.e., the short ARL will be reduced and the long ARL increased.
In case the signal-to-noise ratio is degraded so much that the symbol error probability exceeds p e , however, a problem arises in the performance of the counter, as both the short and long ARL's become less favorable. In real life, the symbol error probability is not constant, and the fact that the long ARL's shorten during periods of low signal-to-noise ratio would introduce the same spurious loss of synch which seems to plague the current Viterbi decoders. If the short ARL gets longer during a period of high symbol error rate, this causes the response time to a loss of synch to increase and may cause a string of data to be lost if a true loss of synch hits at the time of low signal-to-noise ratio, but a shortening of the long ARL whenever there is such a period will have a far greater effect on the overall behavior of the system. This degradation of long ARL can be totally eliminated by giving up the information I z from the even parity check subsequence. When the counter uses only the odd subsequence, the long ARL is unaffected by the signal-to-noise ratio. This is because the odd checks are completely random (independent, with 50 percent probability of success) whenever the process is in synch. Since most of the information comes from the odd subsequence anyway, we believe it is prudent to base the counter on this subsequence alone. The performance parameters in the next section were all calculated for counters based solely on the out-of-synch parity checks. It should be repeated, however, that these performance figures are based on the assumption that the data are a sequence of i.i.d. random variables equally likely to be +1. If the actual data stream deviates significantly from this model, e.g., if long strings of zeros or ones are probable, then the performance of our algorithm will not be as good as predicted.
PERFORMANCE NUMBERS
The size of the ROM needed for counter increments is 2 k . As before, we will describe the counter in terms of the number k of parity checks needed to compute the counter increment.
Once k is chosen, the log-likelihood scheme determines the counter increments. The only question left in algorithm design is the threshold at which the system is declared out of synch. If the threshold is high, the probability of false loss of synch is low, or equivalently, the time between false losses of synch is long. On the other hand, a high threshold will also make the short run length (or the time between loss of synch and detection of that loss of synch) large. We first consider the influence of short run length on system performance. There is an obvious reason to want the short run length to be small: the sooner after a loss of synch that the system gets back on track, the better.
But there is another reason as well. Voyager has a concatenated coding scheme: after the convolutional code is Viterbi decoded, an additional code, the Reed-Solomon code, is decoded, As far as the ReedSolomon decoder is concerned, the data stream during the short run is just a stream of bad data. (Of course, if the out-ofsynch condition was caused by the deletion of a symbol, and the node-synchronizer solves the problem by deleting another symbol, then a whole bit has been deleted, and frame boundaries are lost as well. In this case, the data during the short run can never be recovered. So we will consider the case in which the total number of channel symbols has not been changed. This will be true when the out-of-synch condition was caused by a spurious loss of synch caused by the node synchronizer, since the synchronizer will alternate adding and deleting channel symbols, and will be true half of the time anyway.) The Reed-Solomon decoder can recover a fair amount of bad data, and so if the short run is short enough, the Reed-Solomon decoder will be able to recover it most of the time. So the length of the average short run is not as important as the probability that the Reed-Solomon decoder will be able to recover the data in the short run. For the k = 8 counter, assuming Viterbi burst statistics for 2.3 dB [8] and depth 4 interleaved Reed-Solomon words, Table IV shows the probability of decoding for a word in a frame wholly containing a short run.
This same table shows the long run lengths (both in bits and in time, at the reasonable Voyager data rate of 20 000 bits/s) for these same thresholds. Looking, for example, at threshold 15, we see that the probability that a word contained in a short run will be corrected by the Reed-Solomon decoder is 2/3, and that synch is lost incorrectly every two days.
Can we do better? In fact, by going to k = 16, we can do much better. Table V shows this same information with k = 16. With k = 16 and threshold 14.5, a word which is in a frame attacked by a short run will decode correctly with probability 0.86, and the mean time between false losses of synch (average long run time) is 6.7 years.
These numbers were obtained by simulation methods explained in Appendix B.
Several other questions can be asked about the performance of the counter. What if a short run hits more than one frame? With k = 16 and threshold 14.5, the probability that a short run hits more than one frame is 0.033. And even if the short run does intersect more than one frame, the probability that it causes a word error in each frame is less than 0.005. Thus, the probability of a decoder error in each of two consecutive frames because of a spurious loss of node synchronization is less than 0.0002.
Another question is the probability of some loss of data due to a short run. We saw that in the case k = 16, threshold 14.5, the probability that any one word fails to decode is 0.14, but since decoding failures in the four words are by no means independent, this does not tell us the probability that there is some loss of data-that is, that one or more of the four interleaved Reed-Solomon words fails to decode. In the case k = 16, threshold 14.5, this probability is 0.19.
This counter is "tuned" to the channel; that is, counter increments are based on probabilities, calculated from the channel model, of each block under the "in-synch hypothesis" and the "out-of-synch hypothesis." To make a counter for a channel with other than independent errors, one would make the same calculations using probabilities for that channel. But the values of the even parity checks are determined entirely by ..., E-.,, Eo, E,, -., and so are independent of the odd parity checks. Notice: 1) The fact that we looked at a sequence of odd length was convenient for notation but had no effect on the proof. 2 ) We showed not only that the even and odd parity checks are independent, but that the odd parity checks are themselves i.i.d. with probability 1/2 of success.
3) The same result holds for the measure q , reversing the roles of even and odd.
Corollary: p ( X , = x , 1 X,-,, X n -2 , .-) = p(X n --x n l X n -4 , -.), and the same for q . If n is odd, p ( X , = x , l X n -2 , Xn-4, .*.) = 1/2; for even n , q ( X , = x , JX,-2,
Definition: The one-sided, pseudoparity check sequence xl, 2 2 , ... Proof: The -2: s are derived from the R;s,Going backwards, knowing X I tells you R 1 , and knowing X i and R 1 , . 
and so by the dominated convergence theorem r .
and the same for integration with respect to q . But these are just the information numbers for the counters. Notice: A log-likelihood counter using k panty checks based on parity checks 2 will, after time 2k + 14, have exactly the same increments as a log-likelihood counter using k parity checks and based on parity checks X , because the values of x and X are exactly the same starting at time 14.
Theorem: As k approaches infinity, the information in the log-likelihood counter whose increment at time n is kept separately for n even and odd, approaches all the synch information in the hard-quantized received channel symbol stream R 1 , R 2 , . e . .
Proof: As k goes to infinity, the information in a counter C( 1) based on past of length 2k of the hard-quantized received channel stream approaches all the information in the stream. The values in C(1) are exactly the same as would be in a counter C(2) based on the past of length 2k of the (nonstationary) parity checks xi. For n > 2k -k 14, the increments in counter C(2) are the same as those in a counter C(3) based on the probabilities of (X, *.-, X n -z k ) . But, since even and odd parity checks are independent, this is exactly the same as the counter of the theorem.
APPENDIX B

SIMULATION OF ARL's
The performance figures of Section 111 were obtained by simulation. The short ARL's were simulated directly by generating independent symbol errors with probability p , computing the resulting parity check stream, and feeding it to the counter with threshold y. Direct simulation of the long ARL's is not feasible, however, because (as the results show) the time required to generate a statistically useful sample of long run lengths would be too great.
The long ARL's were simulated by a modification of a standard technique called "importance sampling" 191, in which the process to be analyzed-in this case, the parity check sequence-. is generated using a probability distribution Q different from the distribution P for which results are desired. In our case, P specifies independent 50-50 results for the out-of-synch parity checks-so that the time for the counter to reach a distant threshold y is quite large. A distribution Q was chosen to make the counter reach the threshold more quicklynamely, independent parity checks with probability of failure n*, substantially less than 1/2.
The method of importance sampling is based on the simple fact that for any event A , the probability of A under P can be obtained from simulations carried out under the distribution Q. The key is provided by the identity
Here the quantity dP/dQ is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P with respect to Q, which in our application is simply the likelihood ratio P V l ) ... P(X,> Q(xl> Q ( X n > of the parity checks X1, -., X, up to the time that A occurs.
Since P(Xi) E 1/2, and Q(Xi) = n* if Xi = 1 (failure), = 1 -n* if Xi = 0 (success), relation (1) can be made more explicit.
Using EQ to denote expectation under Q, it takes the form where F and S are the numbers of failures and successes, respectively, in the out-of-synch-parity checks up to the time that A occurs, and 1{A} = 1 if A occurs, = 0 otherwise.
The simulation of the long ARL was based on the definition of a counter cycle. Starting from a given state s* of k zeros and ones, the cycle ends the first time that the counter resets to zero with the same sequence s* in its memory. Let T denote the time (number of symbol pairs) for a cycle to end and let N denote the number of cycles until the threshold y is crossed. Then using a standard result called Wald's equation [3, vol. 11, p. 6011, we have long ARL = EN -ET (Actually, the right side gives the expected time until the end of the first cycle on which y is crossed, but the extra time to end the cycle after crossing is negligible compared to the long ARL.) The quantity ET was easily simulated directly, since when the parity checks are random the cycles end fairly quickly (and do not depend on y at all). The evaluation of EN was based on 1 
E N = -P(A )
where A = {y is crossed} for a given cycle, and P(A) was simulated using the method of importance sampling, as described above. Importance sampling was used to estimate P(A) in several independent sets of simulations. Not surprisingly, the estimates were more stable for smaller thresholds. After all the data were gathered, a least squares line was drawn through the points representing small thresholds (see Figs. 1 and 2 ). These lines were used for the long ARL's in Tables IV and V 
